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Marketplace of Ideas 2.0: Excluding
Viewpoints to Include Individuals
by ROBERT LUTHER III
Introduction
What are the implications of the Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez' decision? First, in ruling that public universities may
require that all recognized student organizations permit any and "all
comers" 2 to be eligible for all offices of the organization, the Court
issued a narrow rule that is praiseworthy for its clarity but for little
else. In the immediate aftermath of the Court's narrow ruling, CLS
asserted it would ultimately prevail on remand, alleging that Hastings
selectively enforced its "all-comers" policy to CLS's detriment,3 but
* Mr. Luther co-authored a brief filed as amicus curiae in support of the Petitioner
on behalf of The Rutherford Institute, a Virginia-based civil liberties organization, in this
case. Many of the ideas discussed herein are contained in the Institute's brief; however,
the remarks in this article are exclusively attributable to the author and do not reflect an
official position of The Rutherford Institute or its affiliate attorneys. Comments are
graciously received at http://www.RobLuther.com.
1. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2. Id. at 2974.
3. Id. at 2995 ("Neither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an
argument that Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy, and this Court is not the
proper forum to air the issue in the first instance. On remand, the Ninth Circuit may
consider CLS's pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is preserved."). Specifically, CLS
alleged that Hastings officials engaged in viewpoint discrimination against CLS by
permitting another student group, La Raza, to restrict its voting membership to students
of Latino or Mexican descent. See Joint Appendix 192, 319; see also David French, CLS v.
Martinez: Further Thoughts (June 28, 2010), http://blog.speakupmovement.org/university/
uncategorized/cls-v-martinez-further-thoughts/ ("There is strong evidence that the
university has, in fact, exempted other, favored, groups from their own policy, with the
racial left advocacy group La Raza permitted to discriminate on the basis of ideology and
race.") (emphasis added); Ted Olsen and Trevor Persaud, Christian Legal Society Loses in
Supreme Court Case (June 2010), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2010/ juneweb-
only/36-11.0.html ("'We believe we will ultimately prevail in this case,' .. . 'The record will
show that Hastings law school applied its policy in a discriminatory way .. . The Supreme
Court did not rule that public universities can apply different rules to religious groups than
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to explore
CLS's allegations.' In view of the now final disposition of the case,
the decision's potential impact is ripe for consideration. With respect
to the decision's immediate impact, one federal appellate circuit has
already concluded that Martinez did not alter the Court's funding-
access precedents.! Second, and on the issue of precedent, it is worth
noting that by ratifying Hastings' "all-comers"' policy, the Court
overlooked numerous precedents and historical facts that recognize
the rights of students to associate with those of similar beliefs on
campus and free of university-imposed burdens. Third, Justice
Kennedy's harsh concurring opinion ascribes a startling sense of
deference to public universities, which is likely to make future First
Amendment challenges by students more difficult. Fourth, while the
"subsidies" camp prevailed in this round of the "rights v. subsidies"
terminology turf war, the dispute is sure to re-emerge in future First
Amendment cases. Fifth, the immediate aftermath of the Martinez
decision yielded thoughtful commentary on the impact of Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth' on the
Court's reasoning in Martinez. The Southworth case proves an able
rival for comparison with Martinez in anticipation of future decisions
on the speech and associational rights of students on public university
campuses. Sixth, this case reflects an illiberal and regrettable trend
by policy-makers to muzzle the First Amendment and exclude
viewpoints simply to include individuals. This article will discuss
these observations in turn.
I. A Narrow Rule?
In Martinez, the Court concluded that public universities may
require that all recognized student organizations permit any and all
comers to be eligible for all offices of the organization, and, if a
university chooses to implement such a policy, it becomes
unconstitutional in application if it is applied unequally to a student
organization on the basis of the organization's status.' As of the date
of this Symposium, one federal court of appeals has addressed the
they apply to political, cultural, or other student groups."') (quoting Professor Michael W.
McConnell).
4. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2010).
6. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2974.
7. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
8. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2971.
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Martinez decision, and the opinion for that panel interpreted
Martinez as having no impact on the Court's predecessor funding-
access cases.9
In Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, a Catholic student group at the
University of Wisconsin that had been denied "funding for prayer,
proselytizing, or religious instruction" saw the Seventh Circuit affirm
by a vote of 2-1 the district court's decision that struck down the
university's selective funding policy.'o After acknowledging that the
circuit had deferred judgment on its decision until after the Court
released Martinez," Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the divided
panel rejected the university's argument that its restriction on funding
these practices was a permissible content-based restriction because, in
short, "Wisconsin has chosen to pay for student-led counseling, and
its decision to exclude counseling that features prayer is forbidden
under Widmar and its successors."12
With respect to Martinez's implications on the decision, Judge
Easterbrook concluded that "[t]here can be no doubt after Christian
Legal Society" that Badger Catholic was entitled to funding because
the university's policy was not viewpoint neutral under Widmar and
Rosenberger.13 In dissent, Judge Williams initially remarked that the
Martinez decision should have caused the panel more pausel prior to
concluding that the panel erred in holding that Badger Catholic was
entitled to funding." By quoting the language and channeling the
spirit of the Martinez opinions authored by Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens," Judge Williams opined that the university's policy was
9. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 781 ("We wanted to see whether the Court would
modify the approach articulated in Widmar, Rosenberger, and Southworth. The Court left
that approach in place and reiterated the norm that universities must make their
recognition and funding decisions without regard to the speaker's viewpoint.").
10. Id. at 777, 782.
11. Id. at 781 ("We deferred action on this appeal while the Supreme Court had
Christian Legal Society under advisement.").
12. Id. at 779.
13. Id. at 778-81.
14. Id. at 784 (Williams, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree, however, with the panel's
conclusion that 'there can be no doubt' that Christian Legal Society decides the issue
here.").
15. Id. ("[NJow, governmental entities can block access to a limited public forum as
long as the neutral barrier is viewpoint neutral.") (citing Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2983).
16. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989 n.16 ("But determinations of what constitutes sound
educational policy or what goals a student organization forum ought to serve fall within
the discretion of school administrators and educators."); id. at 2993 ("It is, after all, hard to
imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept
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reasonable and that "[t]he University has the discretion to decide that
certain activities are worth funding over others, so long as its
decision-making criteria is viewpoint neutral.""
After reviewing the opinions in Badger Catholic, Professor
Steven D. Schwinn noted the recurring Hobson's choice courts face
concerning the dueling characterizations of religious speech under
current First Amendment doctrine:
Any content-based discrimination can be viewpoint discrimination
by discussing the content from a particular viewpoint-
here, e.g., by proselytizing (perhaps the most plausibly content-
based classification among the three in the policy) from a
religious viewpoint. This is not a new problem, and nothing in
Christian Legal Society (or Badger Catholic) solves it.'8
Perhaps the next case concerning funding of religious student
organizations accepted for review by the Court will define with
precision the scope of religious practices that universities can
preclude from funding on the basis of content-based limitations-and
those which exceed the scope of permissible restriction and cause
universities to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Although Widmar
and Rosenberger seemingly moved the Court beyond this ideological
impasse long ago, Martinez has-at least in the mind of one judge in
this case-breathed renewed interest into the pre-Widmar mode of
analysis for resolving funding-access controversies.1 9 Time will tell
whether this approach will regain traction or whether it will remain a
relic rather than the rule.
all comers."); cf Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 788 (Williams, J., dissenting) ("That a state
can choose to fund this category of speech does not create an obligation for it to do so.");
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2992 ("[T]he advisability of Hastings' policy does not control its
permissibility."); Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 786 (Williams, J., dissenting) ("There are
not legal questions but policy questions; they are not for the Court but for the university to
make.") (citing Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
17. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 786 ("Our task is merely to decide whether that
decision was viewpoint neutral, and it was.").
18. Steven D. Schwinn, Funding Policy Discriminates Against Religion, Seventh
Circuit Rules (September 4, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/09/a-
divided-panel-of-the-seventh-circuit-ruledlast-week-that-a-universitys-policy-of-declining-
to-fund-student-group-worship-p.html.
19. See generally Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 782-90 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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II. The Martinez Decision Overlooked Precedent and History
As the Martinez decision and the post-Martinez decision of
Badger Catholic both demonstrate, despite the Court's favorable
ruling towards student religious groups thirty years ago in Widmar v.
Vincent,20 student religious groups have sought continued judicial
intervention in the face of repeated First Amendment infringements
by public school authorities.21 In an attempt to provide the Court
with context for appreciating the freedoms enjoyed by students on
public university campuses in the early days of the republic, The
Rutherford Institute's brief as amicus curiae traced the historical
development of religious practices at a similarly distinguished public
university, the University of Virginia, which was chartered almost
sixty years before Hastings, in 1819. Recognizing that "no other
American of his generation did more to remove shackles from the
mind"2 2 than the University of Virginia's founder, Thomas Jefferson,
the Institute's brief reminded the Court of the prudential
considerations abound in the longstanding traditions of intellectual
freedom of speech and association on public university campuses,
which historically have been guided by broadly drawn policies
providing venues-or in this case, a forum-for expression of all
viewpoints. 23  For example, there is significant evidence indicating
that Jefferson specifically approved of regular religious meetings for
worship and teaching by students of different denominations on the
public grounds of the university.24
20. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court vindicated the
rights of a student religious organization denied access for meetings for worship and
religious discussion in a public university classroom. Id. at 265-67. The Court held that
the exclusion of the student group based on its religious speech violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 273.
21. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475
U.S. 534, 555 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Mark W. Cordes, Religion as Speech:
The Growing Role of Free Speech Jurisprudence in Protecting Religious Liberty, 38 Sw. U.
L. REV. 235, 247 (2008) ("[These] cases had generally the same fact pattern, similar to that
in Widmar.").
22. 6 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 418,
(Little, Brown and Company 1981).
23. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute in Support of Petitioner,
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 581623, at *6-*32.
24. With respect to the locale for student-worship on the university's grounds, "[i]n
his plans, Mr. Jefferson himself suggested that there should be space for a building to be
used for religious worship under what he called 'impartial regulation.' In the meantime
Spring 20111 MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 2.0 677
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Today is no different from 1819 in that "the mission of colleges
and universities includes not only the intellectual development of
students, but also the physical, social, vocational, ethical, and cultural
development as well."25 Moreover, "[u]niversities possess significant
interests in encouraging students to take advantage of social, civic,
cultural, and religious opportunities available in surrounding
communities and throughout the country." 6  Nevertheless, "these
interests considered," the university's primary function continues to
be the education of students and the aftermath of this case presents
public university officials with an invitation to examine whether their
institution's policies promote practices that engage the "marketplace
of ideas" 27 or whether their institution's policies promote practices
that subject students to censorship grounded in an ideology of
political correctness. As Professor William Van Alstyne recognized
forty years ago: "[w]holly apart from the legal compulsion which may
support them, these principles [which promote wide-reaching venues
for student academic and associational freedom] are surely no more
than those that self-respecting institutions of higher learning should
freely desire to secure as worthwhile in themselves."28
Unfortunately, not all "self-respecting institutions of higher
learning" 29 have heeded Professor Van Alstyne's sage advice. Though
history has been and should continue to be a probative while not
dispositive factor weighed in the constitutional decision making
process, the Court's ratification of Hastings' "all-comers"" policy
ignored history and its associated prudential value because the
historical evidence unequivocally supports a broad range of rights for
students on the public university campus, including the rights of
students to associate with those of similar beliefs, free of university-
two of the best rooms in the main building were to be set apart for the purpose." THE
CENTENNIAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 1819 -1921 at 6-7 (John Calvin Metcalf
ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1922). Building complications later caused this plan to be
foregone and Jefferson instead suggested that students and faculty hold worship services
in a room in the Rotunda, which occurred until mid-1837. Id. at 8.
25. Annette Gibbs, The First Amendment and College Student Organizations, 55
PEABODYJ. EDUC. 131, 133 (1978).
26. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234.
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(introducing the "marketplace of ideas" by suggesting that "the ultimate good desired is
best reached by free trade in ideas").
28. William W. Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom,
20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290, 304 (1968).
29. Id.
30. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2974.
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imposed burdens. In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Court's
disquieting opinion "succeeded in enshrining an oppressive political
correctness as a central tenet in American society and in American
university life undermining not only the freedom of association but
the freedom of religion, as well.""
M. Justice Kennedy's Harshly Worded Concurrence
Scholars routinely indulge in Justice Kennedy's opinions due to
his notable position in the Court's political center, but his
concurrence in Martinez is particularly interesting when reviewed in
the context of his earlier opinions in a number of cases involving
religious expression in public life32 and his opinions for the Court in
the homosexual rights cases of Romer v. Evans" and Lawrence v.
Texas.' Unfortunately for religious liberty advocates, "[bjecause of
the critical importance of Justice Kennedy's vote, his brief concurring
opinion is arguably the most important opinion in the case, and that
opinion contains a poison pill for religious liberty."35 Thus, while
Justice Kennedy's brief concurring opinion is the shortest of the four
delivered in this case, "[o]nce more the question echoes: What hath
Justice Kennedy wrought?"3 6
Justice Kennedy commences his concurring opinion by
delineating the concomitant boundaries between the individual and
the institution of higher learning by acknowledging that "'[i]n the
University setting ... the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our
31. John W. Whitehead, Doing Away with the Right to be Different: The Assault on
Religious Freedom (July 6, 2010), http://www.rutherford.org/articlesdb/commentary.
asp?record-id=663.
32. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Westside Sch. Dist. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
33. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35. David French, Overstepping Their Boundaries: The Supreme Court Decides
What's Best for Christians (June 29, 2010), http://townhall.com/columnists/DavidFrench/
2010/06/29/oversteppingjits-boundaries.the.supreme-courtdecides what%E2%80%99s
_best for christians.
36. See Hadley Arkes, Carhart v. Gonzalez: What Hath Kennedy Wrought?, 8
ENGAGE 22, 22 (2007).
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intellectual and philosophic tradition."' He then distinguishes the
public university student religious organization access to funding case
of Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia"
from the present case by reasoning that "[h]ere, the policy applies
equally to all groups and views." 9 However, after his unremarkable
discussion of Rosenberger, the opinion loses grounding in First
Amendment precedents and takes shape as an awkward hybrid of
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter v. Bollingero and his earlier
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.4 1 In Martinez, Justice Kennedy posits
that: "[m]any educational institutions... have recognized that the
process of learning occurs both formally in a classroom setting and
informally outside of it." 42  Later in his concurrence, he returns to
these earlier thoughts by noting that "[a] law school furthers [its]
objectives by allowing broad diversity in registered student
organizations. But these objectives may be better achieved if
students can act cooperatively to learn from and teach each other
through interactions in social and intellectual contexts. A vibrant
dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves off from opposing
points of view."43
Yet, after close examination, it does not appear that this
language is applicable to the facts of this case. Ostensibly, as the
Grutter opinion reasons, there are benefits to be gained by the
"robust exchange of ideas"" in a classroom. But Justice Kennedy
conflates his vision of the classroom situation with the student
organization scenario by overlooking the fact that when students
enroll in student-organized political or spiritual groups like Students
37. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 835).
38. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
39. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Kennedy
does not state that the policy was applied equally, since that question remained open on
remand. See id. at 3000 ("In addition to a circumstance, already noted, in which it could
be demonstrated that a school has adopted or enforced its policy with the intent or
purpose of discriminating or disadvantaging a group on account of its views, ... ").
40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
41. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
42. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Southworth, 529 U.S.
at 233).
43. Id. at 2999-3000.
44. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
312-13 (1978)); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.").
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for a Democratic Society,45 Wide Awake Productions,46 the Boy
Scouts of America,47 and Hastings' chapter of CLS, they are actively
looking to mingle with those who share a common ideology. To
invite nonadherent student leaders into a situation where legitimate
adherents are deceived into believing that they are sharing a faithful
experience with other legitimate adherents chills (in the case of a
religious organization) the Free Exercise of religion and the Free
Association rights of the legitimate adherents. A group's choice of
leaders matters because leaders' choices matter for the group. When
public university officials meddle with this process, their conduct calls
to mind the similar constitutionally infirm inquiry originated when, in
the absence of "clear evidence of incitement or a conspiracy to
engage in unlawful conduct," 48 a state actor inserts a nonadherent into
a church, synagogue, or mosque to obtain information on the
members of that spiritual body.
To his credit, unlike the majority opinion that "emphasiz[es] the
value of dissent within groups," 49 as if to imply that it is appropriate
for students to pursue actions or behaviors that subvert a group's
common purpose, Justice Kennedy demonstrates an understanding of
student purpose on the public university campus that is significantly
more reasonable. For example, in Southworth, he observed that
"[s]tudents enroll in public universities to seek fulfillment of their
personal aspirations and of their own potential."s Yet, despite
adhering to this optimistically libertarian outlook on student purpose,
Justice Kennedy fails to apply the same libertarian logic and
recognize that many, if not most, students enroll in university course
offerings as the consequence of spontaneous order determined by a
myriad of variables, such as the course requirements for a degree
within a particular discipline, who is teaching, and/or the time of day
it is offered. For freshmen students, course selection may be
determined by an even more impersonal vehicle such as whether the
45. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
46. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
47. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
48. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Is Monitoring Moslem Religious
Services Without Particularized Suspicion Constitutional?, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Dec. 4,
2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20091204.html.
49. David French, CLS v. Martinez: My First Quick Take, NATIONAL REVIEW
ONLINE (June 28, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/230398/i-cs-v-
martinez-i-my-first-quick-take/david-french.
50. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231.
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first letter of his or her last name is in the first or last half of the
alphabet. Quite to the contrary of membership in a student
organization, where ideology is often the purpose of the group's
existence, when most students make the decision to enroll in a
particular course in pursuit of obtaining a degree, they rarely take
into consideration the ideologies of the students sitting in the desks
around them.
As he progresses with this line of reasoning, Justice Kennedy
goes on to assert that "[t]he Hasting [sic] program is designed to allow
all students to interact with their colleagues across a broad, seemingly
unlimited range of ideas, views, and activities."" Ignoring the fact
that debates and co-sponsored events serve this function without
infringing on a group's internal autonomy, he then quotes from
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke:
[A] great deal of learning . .. occurs through interactions among
students ... who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and
perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn
from their differences and to stimulate one another to
reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about
themselves and their world.
Justice Kennedy's reference to Bakke here-in a case where the
Court stonewalled multiple significant First Amendment
"concern[s]""-paints a chillingly deferential picture of the future of
politically disfavored groups on public university campuses. It is well-
established that the Bakke case stands for three propositions. First,
quotas based exclusively on racial criteria are unconstitutional in
university admissions;54 second, because academic freedom "long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment," university
professors are entitled to pursue wide-ranging methods in the quest
for truth; and third, as a corollary to the "special concern[s],"
51. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 313, n.48 (1978)
(alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 312.
54. Id. at 289-90 ("Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line
drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.. .The guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal.").
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surrounding the notion of academic freedom, university
administrators are entitled to make their "own judgments as to
education" including "the selection of its student body."" However,
just as the Bakke case recognized that the "judgments as to
education"" made by public university officials to govern the internal
operations of their schools may not come at the expense of students'
rights to Equal Protection under the law, Bakke's "concerns" were-
and continue to be-insufficient to confer upon public universities
permission to enact policies that categorically exclude student
members of a major world religion from access to resources available
to all other student groups.
Upon the conclusion of his reference and related commentary on
Bakke, Justice Kennedy reprises his familiar role as arbiter of the
nation's social conscience-played perhaps most definitively in
Lawrence v. Texas, where his opinion for the Court struck down a
state law criminalizing sodomy." In this section of his Martinez
concurrence, Justice Kennedy appears to draw some parallel between
CLS's required profession of faith and a "regime" 8 that mandated
compelled disclosure of "private, off-campus behavior," 9 in what
projects as a not-so-subtle Lawrence-based criticism of CLS's
practices. Justice Kennedy concludes this section in what has been
described as "both a disturbing misunderstanding of faith statements
and an odd blurring of spiritual and political spheres,"a by
proclaiming that "[t]he era of loyalty oaths is behind us." 61
Here, Justice Kennedy's allusion to loyalty oaths is concernedly
misplaced. Martinez is a far cry from the "loyalty oath[]"' cases
Justice Kennedy alludes to but fails to cite as authority to support his
conclusion.63 "Compulsion" was only an issue in this case to the
55. Id. at 312.
56. Id.
57. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-79 (2003) (holding that Texas statute
criminalizing sodomy violates the Due Process Clause).
58. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Alec Hall, Is the Christian Legal Society's Loss a Loss for Everyone?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 7, 2010, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2010/julyweb-
only/37-32.0.html.
61. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring); but see French, supra note
35 ("Didn't each justice take an oath when they joined the Court?").
62. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (not granting exemption
from service in the armed forces to individual who objected to service in a specific military
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extent that Hastings "compelled" CLS to associate with individuals
who did not adhere to the group's core values and beliefs. In
response, CLS simply acted according to the tenets of its theological
principles by exercising its First Amendment rights to be free from
compelled association on campus.
Moreover, quite to the contrary of the quasi-Equal Protection
analysis proffered by Justice Kennedy, Bakke's nexus to this case
stems exclusively from its discussion of academic freedom. As Justice
Souter acknowledged earlier in Southworth, "[w]hile we have spoken
in terms of a wide protection for academic freedom ... we have never
held that universities lie entirely beyond the reach of students' First
Amendment rights."" On the contrary, the Court's cases have left
"no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and association
extend to the campuses of state universities."' Here, CLS's academic
freedom "concern[s]"6 should have been acknowledged by both the
university and the Court-as even the most recent Statement on
Academic Freedom issued by the American Association of University
Professors ("AAUP") recognizes. Ironically, as the initial
conflict); Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (granting exemption to individuals who
objected to service in the armed forces for reasons other than the belief in a "supreme
being" so long as such "religious beliefs" parallel those of a God); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) (granting same exemption as that in Welsh); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958) (striking down California requirement that veterans swear oath not to
advocate the overthrow of federal or state government in order to obtain property tax
exemption); W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (reinstating public
grammar school students expelled for failing to engage in flag salute). Contra, Cole v.
Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972) (upholding state hospital's decision to discharge
employee for failing to swear oath to uphold U.S. Constitution and oppose overthrow of
U.S. government); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works of L.A., 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding
validity of loyalty oath requiring employees to have ceased associating with groups
advocating the overthrow of U.S. and California government within five years prior to
obtaining city employment and requiring employees to execute an affidavit identifying
whether and when, if ever, the individual had been a Communist); American Commc'ns
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding provision of Taft-Hartley Act requiring
officers of labor unions to sign loyalty oath affidavits); Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 56 (1951) (upholding state law requiring candidates for municipal office to take
loyalty oath prior to having names placed on the ballot).
64. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 238-39 (Souter, J., concurring).
65. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,180
(1972)).
66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment.").
67. The most recent AAUP JOINT STATEMENT ON THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
OF STUDENTS (2006), available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/
contents/stud-rights.htm, provides, in pertinent part: "Campus organizations, including
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beneficiaries of the academic freedom language contained in the
Bakke decision, the University of California would have had the
Court ignore the rationale for preserving academic freedom it
previously adopted to suppress the First Amendment rights of a
group whose members hold the diverse views Justice Powell
endeavored to preserve on the University of California campus over
thirty years ago.68 It is equally ironic that Justice Kennedy would
quote one of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court discussions of academic
freedom as authority to subordinate CLS's numerous First
Amendment and academic freedom concerns to a university
inclusivity policy at odds with the very freedoms it purports to
preserve.
In his final justification of the "all-comers policy," Justice
Kennedy recognizes that "petitioner [] would have a substantial case
on the merits if it were shown that the "all-comers" policy was either
designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge its leadership in
order to stifle its views." " Yet given this language, and considering
that one amicus brief filed in support of the university conceded that
the nondiscrimination policy allowed students to "effect change from
within,""o why did Justice Kennedy not conclude that CLS had a
"substantial case on the merits"?" As CLS attorney Michael
McConnell noted, "if any hostile students actually take advantage of
the policy, it would become unconstitutional."72 But how can a policy
that passes constitutional muster on its face, that is not crafted with
those affiliated with an extramural organization, should be open to all students without
respect to race, creed, or national origin, except for religious qualifications which may be
required by organizations whose aims are primarily sectarian." Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
This statement not only affirms the AAUP's initial 1968 Joint Statement, but includes an
additional footnote explicitly recognizing that the "obligation of institutions with respect
to nondiscrimination, with the exception noted above for religious qualifications, should be
understood in accordance with the expanded statement on nondiscrimination in n.3,
above." Id. at 279, n.8 (referencing a broad nondiscrimination statement that includes
sexual orientation). Notably, the AAUP filed a brief as amicus curiae in the U.S. Supreme
Court in support of the University and in contradiction to its aforestated guidance.
68. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
69. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Associated Students of the University of California,
Hastings College of Law ("ASUCH") in Support of Respondents at 8-9, Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (Mar. 15, 2010).
71. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Ted Olsen and Trevor Persaud, Christian Legal Society Loses in Supreme Court
Case, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (June 28, 2010), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2010/
juneweb-only/36-11.0.html (quoting Michael W. McConnell).
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animus towards a protected class, "become unconstitutional"" when
it is adhered to as it is written? Moreover, who should a dispossessed
plaintiff sue in such a circumstance? Should he or she sue the
"hostile" 74 students, university officials for having enacted the policy,
both, or some other assortment of individuals and/or entities?"
In sum, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, like many if not most of
his opinions, is crafted in a voice distinctly his own and replete with
statements ripe for controversial discussions within the legal academy
76and the body politic at large. But the reasoning behind his harshly
worded criticism directed at CLS ultimately proves unpersuasive
given the heterogeneity of mandatory class enrollment, the
homogeneity of voluntary student organizations, and his otherwise
strained attempt force-feed an Equal Protection component where
none may be found.
IV. The Inevitable Debate Between Benefits versus Subsidies
Although the Court hangs its hat on its statement that "[i]t is,
after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one
requiring all student groups accept all comers,"" in reality the analysis
is not so simple, as the Court's cases have long shown that policies of
ostensible neutral application may not operate in a discriminatory
manner to deny First Amendment freedoms." In fact, courts
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3019 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Justice Kennedy takes a
similarly mistaken track. He contends that CLS 'would have a substantial case on the
merits if it were shown that the all-comers policy was . . . used to infiltrate the group or
challenge its leadership in order to stifle its views,' but he does not explain on what ground
such a claim could succeed. The Court holds that the accept-all-comers policy is viewpoint
neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes of the RSO forum. How could those
characteristics be altered by a change in the membership of one of the forum's registered
groups? No explanation is apparent.") (internal citation omitted).
76. See French, supra note 35 ("Reading the entire concurrence, one gets the
impression that Justice Kennedy simply did not like the Christian Legal Society at
Hastings, viewing its effort to maintain doctrinal fidelity through a statement of faith with
extreme suspicion if not disgust.").
77. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2977.
78. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520-21
(1993) (striking down facially neutral law forbidding animal sacrifice because it was
enacted with a discriminatory purpose and clarifying the holding of Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990) which held that "a law
that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest
if it is neutral and of general applicability"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982)
(striking down facially neutral law requiring religious organizations that obtained over 50
[Vol. 38:3686 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 2.0
typically, and for good reason, frown upon government demands that
individuals or groups give up one constitutional right (in this case, the
right of a group to impose limited election criteria on those who
would serve as the group's leaders) in exchange for another (the right
to be recognized on an equal basis with other groups)," and the Court
has long-evidenced skepticism towards state conditioning of
resources, benefits, and/or access to fora upon the religious beliefs of
potential recipients.' Finally, the Court has been particularly
sensitive to burdens placed on students by public school
administrators in the context of the student/school administrator
relationship." Yet despite the Court's past admonitions, that is what
happened in this case. The university conditioned a group's access to
resources on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights and the
Court ratified its actions.' By "inviting,8 a student organization to
percent of their funds from nonmembers to report donations to Department of Commerce
because the law was enacted with the purpose of "burden[ing] or favor[ing] selected
religious denominations"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down
facially neutral law requiring laundries operating in wooden buildings to obtain permit
because the law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose).
79. See Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("[f]or at least a [half]-century, this Court has made clear that ... [the
government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests.") (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972)).
80. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(holding that unemployment benefits could not be conditioned upon foregoing religious
beliefs that were adopted after employment commenced); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that unemployment benefits
could not be conditioned upon the rejection of religious beliefs that compelled resignation
upon knowledge that continued employment would require the production of parts used
for construction of weapons); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the
state of South Carolina had unconstitutionally conditioned a government benefit,
unemployment benefits, on a Seventh Day Adventist's rejection of religious beliefs that
prohibited her from working on a day of the week required for continued employment).
81. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 54, Westphal v. Wagner, No. 10-5571 (9th Cir.
July 12, 2010) ("But while there might be 'heightened concerns' with protecting
elementary- and high-school students from religious coercion, no court has ever held the
coercion test inapplicable to college students or adults."); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.
S. 577, 592 (1992) ("As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools." (citations omitted)).
82. Adam Goldstein, The Supreme Court's CLS Decision Sucker-Punches First
Amendment, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
adam-goldstein/supreme-courts-cls-decisi b_628329.html ("The Court's ruling basically
amounted to an examination of the following question: does the First Amendment and its
attendant rights of free speech and free association, permit a college to require a group to
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abandon sincerely held religious beliefs as a condition to gain equal
access to a forum, funding, and facilities, and then de-recognizing the
group after it declined the invitation to negotiate, the university's
conduct warranted judicial resolution in favor of CLS." In arguing
that government-provided benefits can be conditioned upon the
relinquishment of group members' beliefs, or, in this case, group
members' sincerely held religious beliefs, Professor Eugene Volokh
reasons as follows:
The right to privately educate our children doesn't equal a right
to government funding for private schools. The right to
abortion doesn't obligate the government to allow abortions in
county hospitals. The right to urge voters to elect a candidate
doesn't entitle tax-exempt nonprofits to use tax-deductible (and
thus subsidized) contributions to engage in such speech. 5
In other words, if a group desires access to a publically funded,
university furnished forum-whether that forum be in the form of a
classroom or email distribution list-it must be receptive to all those
who apply."
While Professor Michael McConnell clearly disagrees with
Professor Volokh regarding the disposition of this case, these
gentlemen agree that:
[O]ne of the fundamental issues at stake here is what is
considered a benefit or subsidy, and whether the right to speak
on an equal basis in a public forum is a benefit or subsidy that
admit members that offend its religious ideology as a condition of access to limited public
forum resources?").
83. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27347 at *12 (N.D. Cal., April 17, 2006) (as amended May 19, 2006) ("Hastings informed
CLS that its bylaws did not appear to be compliant with the Nondiscrimination Policy, in
particular the religion and sexual orientation provisions, and invited CLS to discuss
changing them.").
84. Nurre v. Whitehead, 130 S. Ct. 1937, 1939 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) ("when a public school purports to allow students to express themselves, it
must respect the students' free speech rights. School administrators may not behave like
puppet masters who create the illusion that students are engaging in personal expression
when in fact the school administration is pulling the strings.").
85. Eugene Volokh, On Free Association the Court Makes the Right Call, NY DAILY
NEWS (June 29, 2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/06/29/2010-
06-29_onfreeassociationthe_courtmakestherightscall.html.
86. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1943 (2006).
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the state can withhold on the basis of its approval or
disapproval of a group's practices."
But here, the subsidy-based lens referenced by Professor McConnell
(and applied by the Court) does not bring to mind Southworth so
much as Rust v. Sullivan-a recurring bull-in-the-china-shop of First
Amendment jurisprudence and bane to religious liberty." Although
both Rosenberger and Southworth rejected Rust's applicability to
fora,"9 echoes of Rust nevertheless ring throughout the Martinez
opinion. For example, in concluding that Hastings need not supply
"what is effectively a state subsidy"" the Court bites hook, line, and
sinker into the rule from Rust that when the government chooses to
fund speech, it "has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of another."9' The
relationship between access and funding described by the Court here
calls to mind the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," which are
comprised of "situations in which the government has placed a
condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular
87. Timothy Dalrymple, You Cannot Be an Equal Participant in the Marketplace of
Ideas, PATHEOS (June 28, 2010), http://www.patheos.com/Resources/Additional-
Resources/You-Cannot-be-an-Equal-Participant-in-the-Marketplace-of-Ideas.html.
88. This article does not mean to suggest that the government may not fund programs
of its choosing subject to constitutional limitations. It merely intends to question whether
the funding of government programs, should constitute "government speech" (as the U.S.
Supreme Court's cases have indeed so concluded). Moreover, even if challenges to the
funding of government programs should appropriately be subject to analysis under the
"government speech" doctrine, it seems reasonable that the standard for evaluating
government program funding in the cases of Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(abortion), Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (legal aid services) and
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (promotion of beef
consumption) be different than the standard applied in cases concerning individual
religious practices more commonly associated with First Amendment rubric, such as
legislative prayer or, in this case, religious student association on public facilities. See
Robert Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the 'Prayer Police': Why the
First Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands a 'Practice Focused'
Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 593-96 (2008) (arguing that legislative prayer
should not be analyzed as "government speech.").
89. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (2000) ("If the challenged speech here were
financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its
content, the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the
speaker. That is not the case before us."); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("[In Rust,] the
government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.").
90. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
91. Rust, 500 U.S. at 174.
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program or service."" In this case, CLS sought access to the
university's forum; therefore, the Court determined that if CLS
wished to retain access, its members were required to adhere to a
system of beliefs and practices approved by the university's
administrators.' Not surprisingly, the flaw inherent in this
understanding of the relationship between access and funding was
exposed in the Wall Street Journal the day following the Court's
decision:
Government may "own" the roads, but that doesn't mean it can
say citizens can only drive if their associations meet government
approval. Just because private schools and churches receive the
"subsidy" of tax exemptions doesn't mean the government can
say they must accept all comers.94
Given the Court's conclusion, perhaps it is time to reconsider
whether the receipt of benefits or, in the Court's vocabulary,
"subsidies", should remain a viable test for whether the university
retains control of the speech offered through its fora, or perhaps a
heightened state interest should be advanced when a university seeks
to restrict resources to a student group. Justice Alito seems to
suggest that heightened review may be advisable in future university
student funding cases through his observations that "funding plays a
very small role in this case" and "[i]f every such activity is regarded as
a matter of funding, the First Amendment rights of students at public
universities will be at the mercy of the administration."9 5 This point
has been further argued that ".. . the vast majority of campus
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Nevertheless, both Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) and Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819 (1995) indicate that student activity fee monies are not public money or a
state subsidy. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 222 ("The fee is segregated from the
University's tuition charge."); Id. at 229 ("If the challenged speech here were financed by
tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its content, the case
might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the speaker. That is not
the case before us."); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 ("But the $14 paid each semester by
the students is not a general tax designed to raise revenue for the University.") (citations
omitted); Id., 515 U.S. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Unlike monies dispensed from
state or federal treasuries, the Student Activities Fund is collected from students who
themselves administer the fund and select qualifying recipients only from among those
who originally paid the fee. The government neither pays into nor draws from this
common pool").
94. The Supreme Court's 'Subsidies', WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at A18.
95. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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ministries regard such fees to be an irrelevant side show. What really
counts is having access to students, facilities, and communications on
par with secular student groups."' Still, Professor Volokh concludes
that this case is "all about the money": "where government funding
isn't involved, both religious groups and secular ideological groups
have a constitutional right to exclude prospective members who don't
share their views. But where the government chooses to provide
subsidies, it may impose nondiscrimination conditions on those
subsidies."" However, his argument does not address the language
from Rosenberger and Southworth which implies that student activity
fee monies are not public money or a state subsidy. 8
V. The Martinez Decision was Wrongly Decided
Notwithstanding the Disposition in South worth
No discussion of "subsidies," funding, resources, and/or access to
fora with respect to student organizations on public university
campuses would be complete without reference to the Court's
decision in Board of Regents of Wisconsin System v. Southworth." In
Southworth, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge from
a student who sought an exemption from a university policy that
required all students to contribute a set sum to a communal student
activities fund accessible to all registered student organizations.t " In
rejecting the student's challenge, the Court noted that "[w]hile
[earlier] precedents identify the interests of the protesting students,
the means of implementing First Amendment protections adopted in
those decisions are neither applicable nor workable in the context of
extracurricular student speech at a university.".o. In distinguishing
earlier precedents, which had struck down a regulation both requiring
nonunion teachers to pay a service fee equivalent to union dues for
funding political speech'" and which had permitted mandatory bar
dues to fund political speech,03 the Court nevertheless permitted the
California bar to require its member to fund activities "germane" to
96. Alec Hill, Is the Christian Legal Society's Loss a Loss for Everyone?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2010/julyweb-only/37-32.0.html.
97. Volokh, supra note 85.
98. See supra note 93.
99. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 217.
100. Id. at 223.
101. Id. at 230.
102. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
103. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
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the association's mission of "regulating the legal profession and
improving the quality of legal services."'" Because the payment of
bar dues to improve the quality of legal services was "germane" to the
association's mission of regulating the legal profession, the Court
concluded that the University of Wisconsin's student funding
requirement, which was "for the sole purpose of facilitating the free
and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students"0 s was
equivalently "germane." Thus, in view of the fact that a student
activity fund is germane to the purposes of a university's mission, and
all students had access to funding, the Southworth decision seems
quite appropriately within the scope of the Court's earlier funding
decisions in Abood and Keller.
The body text of the majority opinion in Martinez cites the
Southworth decision only once and that citation was not for
substantive support but with respect to a procedural matter. o0
Perhaps surprisingly, significant criticism has been directed at
Southworth in the wake of the Martinez decision. This criticism has
suggested that the "all-comers"',07 policy is "fruit of the poisonous
tree" of Southworth.'" It further contends that, in the mind of the
Court, because Southworth failed to grant a student an exemption
from paying his student activities fee, no student should be restricted
in his or her ability to run for any office in any registered student
organizations on campus." In other words, because the student paid
104. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231 (quoting 496 U.S. at 13-14).
105. Id. at 229.
106. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2983 ("This Court has accordingly refused to consider a
party's argument that contradicted a joint 'stipulation [entered] at the outset of th[e]
litigation."') (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 226). Although the opinion of the Court
revisits the Southworth decision in a later footnote, the clear purpose of this footnote is
merely to respond to allegations made in Justice Alito's dissent. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at
2993 n.25. It therefore seems a stretch to attribute substantial credit to the opinion of the
Court with respect to Southworth's impact on the disposition in Martinez.
107. Id. at 2978.
108. Dalrymple, supra note 87 (quoting David French) ("I read the decision as
basically this-and this is something I just wrote in National Review Online: in many ways
(and I'm going to get into legal wonkery here) I see this case as the fruit of the poisonous
tree of an earlier bad Supreme Court decision. That previous bad Supreme Court decision
is the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth. In that case,
the Supreme Court ruled that they can force students to pay money into a pool that is then
used to fund student organizations that may have views that other students abhor. In
other words, you are forced to fund speech that you abhor.").
109. Id. ("In Ginsburg's opinion, under the 'all comers' policy, no student can be
excluded from a group they are forced to fund. So you see the direct line of thinking from
Southworth. You take a bad decision, which is to force students to fund groups that they
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for it, he or she cannot be kept out. Consequently, the Court
concluded that Hastings' "all-comers" policy passed constitutional
muster.
But ultimately the Court's opinion in Southworth may not be as
much a boon to First Amendment jurisprudence as has been
averred.o While the facts of the Court's funding-access cases differ,
the constitutional substance of these cases can be distilled to the
question of whether an individual or group has been denied funding
or access on the basis of its religious viewpoint."' For that reason, the
Southworth decision is correct, because although the Court held that
the student could not obtain an exemption from paying the activity
fee, the student was not denied an opportunity to access activity funds
either, as the Wide Awake group was in Rosenberger, as CLS was in
this case by Hastings' requirement that the group compromise its core
values to obtain access to funding, and as Badger Catholic was in the
Seventh Circuit's recent post-Martinez decision."2 Additionally, in
the wake of Martinez, it has been argued that the Court adopted a
rule without considering the "practical considerations""' of enforcing
the policy. Indeed, the university will have future burdens to bear if it
chooses to continue to enforce this policy, but in acknowledging the
future burdens to be borne by universities, one should note that if
Southworth had been decided to the contrary, universities a decade
find abhorrent. Then you say, we will have a regulation that requires everyone to be able
to join groups they are forced to fund.").
110. French, supra note 49 ("This forced-funding regime is unique to student
organizations on our nation's campuses. In virtually no other context are citizens directly
forced to fund expression they may abhor. Such a requirement exerts a powerful
distorting effect on university jurisprudence, has spawned significant additional litigation,
and directly influenced the outcome of the Martinez case.").
111. See Martinez, 130 at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("In an unbroken line of decisions
analyzing private religious speech in limited public forums, we have made it perfectly clear
that '[r]eligion is [a] viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed."') (citing Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U. S. 98, 112, and n.4 (2001) (declaring unconstitutional public
school board decision to deny middle school students access to use school facilities
immediately after school hours for religious activities); Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional public university decision to
withhold funding from student religious publication); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (declaring unconstitutional public
school board decision to deny religious organization access to use school facilities after
school hours for religious purposes); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)
(declaring unconstitutional public university action prohibiting religious group from access
to university classroom for worship and religious discussion).
112. Luther & Caddell, supra note 88 at 591 ("the constitutional concern arises when
another party is denied an opportunity to offer his or her prayer.") (emphasis added).
113. Dalrymple, supra note 87 (quoting David French).
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ago would have been tasked with similar administrative hassles like
those being raised as the consequence of the Martinez decision. This
point does not attempt to validate the Court's opinion in Martinez,
but should mute the criticism directed at Southworth. As alluded to
above, the Court's student-funding cases are more akin to its access
cases than to its exemption cases. Thus, when no students are denied
access to funds to start their own associations, no concrete
constitutional injury exists, and when no constitutional injury exists,
none may be attributed to the university or the student groups."4
It may even be argued that the Southworth decision supported
CLS's claims. For example, since under Southworth, students may
not obtain exemptions from being required to fund "thought that
[they] hate""' why then would that line of logic not require the
activities fund to permit funding of "hate[d] thought""6 in CLS's case
as well? The issue boils down to how the constitutional right at issue
is framed."' Because the heart of the issue in this case is the right to
associate with a group of individuals who share similar ideological
worldviews, the Southworth case is right and the Martinez case is
wrong."'
VI. Excluding Viewpoints to Include Individuals
It was once considered a timeless maxim of the U.S.
constitutional tradition that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."ll9 Only a decade ago, the high Court reinforced this
maxim by affirming that "protecting expressive associations from
antidiscrimination laws 'is crucial in preventing the majority from
imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps
114. Luther & Caddell, supra note 88 at 582 n.82 ("By failing to focus on the prayer
opportunity, the court found four sectarian prayers unconstitutional-not because
someone had suffered a legitimate constitutional injury by being denied the opportunity to
pray-but simply because all the prayers were Christian.").
115. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
116. Id.
117. Dalrymple, supra note 87 ("It goes back to this initial question of what is the right
at stake. If you have a free association right here, then CLS has a constitutional right that
exists independently of anything else, to reserve its membership and leadership for people
who share its values.") (quoting David French).
118. Id.
119. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
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unpopular ideas."' 120 Unfortunately, the Martinez decision calls the
timelessness of these First Amendment ideals into question. Today,
the "right to be different"121 is under siege. The corollary question
poised to inflict damage on First Amendment jurisprudence is
whether policy-makers will continue to "rephrase their desire to
exclude viewpoints as a desire to include individuals."122 Regrettably,
in the aftermath of the Martinez decision, ". . . the true marketplace
of ideas exists by permission (or, more likely, apathy) of the
majority. ,123
Fortunately, enforcement of this distorted perception of the
"marketplace of ideas"1  carries with it significant political burdens
poised to stall this voyage, and if additional universities choose to
adopt an "all-comers" 125 policy, the Constitution obligates them to
apply the policy equally to all student groups on campus. Presuming
additional universities attempt to employ the "all-comers"126 policy to
student bodies en masse, they are likely to learn in short order that
members of Christian student organizations are not so unique in their
First Amendment convictions after all.
120. Steven H. Aden & Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Ph.D., Catch or Release? The
Employment Non-Discrimination Act's Exemption for Religious Organizations, 11
ENGAGE 4 (September 2010) (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-
48 (2000) (upholding the right of Boy Scouts to dismiss a homosexual scoutmaster
notwithstanding anti-discrimination law).
121. Whitehead, supra note 31 (observing that "[t]he Court's 5-4 ruling against CLS
reeked of anti-religious prejudice.").
122. Goldstein, supra note 82.
123. French, supra note 49.
124. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(introducing the "marketplace of ideas" by suggesting that "the ultimate good desired is
best reached by free trade in ideas").
125. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
126. Id.
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